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THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGA-
TION. By Raymond Wolters. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee 
Press. 1984. Pp. 345. $24.95. 
Professor Raymond Wolters'1 The Burden of Brown explores sev-
eral issues that have preoccupied legal commentators, educators, poli-
ticians, and parents of school children since the Supreme Court 
decided Brown v. Board of Education. 2 The Burden of Brown ques-
tions the proper role of judicial review in a constitutional democracy 
and, more pointedly, whether color-conscious remedies that focus on 
racial balance as opposed to simply prohibiting de jure segregation, 
such as forced busing, are a legitimate extension of Brown. Wolters' 
answer is that Brown should be interpreted as prohibiting only official 
racial discrimination, not as condemning color-neutral policies that 
fail to achieve substantive racial integration (p. 288). 3 Thus, Wolters 
views post-Brown judicial decisions, in which courts nullified time-
tested color-neutral policies of local school boards and school superin-
tendents, as nothing more than judges dictating social policy. 
To support his argument, Professor Wolters presents five case his-
tories of school desegregation and integration: Washington, D.C.; 
Prince Edward County, Virginia; Clarendon County, South Carolina; 
New Castle County, New Jersey; and Topeka, Kansas. All of these 
school districts were involved in what are commonly known as the 
1. Wolters is Professor of History at the University of Delaware. 
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
3. "Desegregation" requires the removal of all racial barriers while "integration" involves an 
affirmative duty to create racial balance. 
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original School Desegregation Cases. 4 The choice oflocales is no acci-
dent, since The Burden of Brown was conceived as a response and se-
quel to Richard Kluger's Simple Justice. 5 In a bibliographical note 
Wolters explains that "the story of desegregation was not as simple as 
[depicted in] Kluger's morality tale" (p. 329). The Burden of Brown 
was thus conceived as a "balanced account" of the events that fol-
lowed Brown (p. 329). 
Wolter's argument, repeated in each of the five case histories, is 
that the judiciary's attempt to force integration on white middle-class 
families was doomed to failure. Through numerous quotations from 
the affected parties, Wolters argues that by mandating forced busing to 
remedy desegregation and extending Brown to require complete racial 
balance, judges advocated a remedy that was sociologically unsound 
and would be firmly resisted by white parents. Wolters thus places the 
blame for white flight to the suburbs, the deterioration of public edu-
cation, and the eventual resegregation of public school systems on 
post-Brown judicial decisions. Wolters' argument is not new, and the 
case study approach focusing on the personalities and political forces 
that affect a controversy has also been used before in this context. 6 
Perhaps the only additional contribution of The Burden of Brown is 
that it forcefully presents the white parents' perspective in the school 
desegregation and integration controversy. But in so doing, The Bur-
den of Brown forfeits any claim to being a "balanced" account (p. 
329). 
Throughout the book, Wolters explores white parents' and the 
white community's various fears about racial integration in order to 
explain why whites would resolutely resist the judiciary's attempts at 
integration. But what Wolters portrays as the white community's 
heartfelt fear of integration often appears to the reader to be nothing 
more than sincere but prejudiced belief. For example, in describing the 
problems that accompanied racial desegregation in Washington, D.C., 
Wolters lists among the several factors that created a rapidly deterio-
rating school environment, whites' concern over the high incidence of 
venereal disease and pregnancies among the black students and atten-
dant fear that desegregation "would have a tendency to bring white 
girls down to [the] level [of blacks]" (p. 14). Similarly, in discussing 
the Prince Edward desegregation conflict, Wolters quotes a school su-
4. Brown v. Board of Educ. was heard together with Briggs v. Elliott on appeal from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina. Davis v. County School 
Bd. was heard on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia, and Gebhart v. Belton came to the Court on certiorari from the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware. The public school system of Washington, D.C., was desegregated pursuant to Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), decided the same day as Brown. 
5. R. KI.UGER, SIMPLE JusncE (1975). 
6. See, e.g., D. KIRP, Jusr SCHOOLS: THE IDEA OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN EDU· 
CATION (1982). 
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perintendent as saying that "[s]exual promiscuity is what [whites] fear 
most" (p. 84). And in the New Castle chapter, Wolters describes a 
white father's concern over the possibility that his boy would "come 
away from school with a colored bride" (p. 181). 
Wolters so insistently presents the white parents' perspective in the 
school integration controversy that his narrative account of the post-
Brown events often turns into a carefully documented catalogue of the 
old and tired cliches about blacks believed by some white parents and 
educators at the time the courts were mandating racial integration. 
Herein lies the major flaw of The Burden of Brown. Wolters' narrative 
technique of quoting extremist views of race relations and his repeated 
use of discredited views to support his argument has the net effect of 
substantially defacing, rather than supporting, what might have been a 
creditable thesis. For example, in describing the Charleston, South 
Carolina, school desegregation litigation,7 Wolters outlines the segre-
gationists' efforts to persuade the district court that there was a ra-
tional basis for segregation. The school board presented an expert 
witness, a professor of anatomy, who testified that "[t]he average black 
brain weighed about 9 percent less than that of the average white, the 
cortex was about 14 percent thinner, and the prefontal area of the 
white brain was larger." These "hereditary characteristics" created 
differences in the races' aptitudes for education, "and their effects 
could not be overcome by desegregation" (p. 147). Resuscitating this 
type of argument does nothing to enhance Wolters' main thesis that 
decisions regarding education should be made democratically at the 
local level and not mandated by judges. Instead, the effect of Wolters' 
insertion of so many racially offensive statements throughout the book 
is that the reader loses receptivity to the white parents' position in this 
controversy. Thus, the major problem with The Burden of Brown is 
that Wolters' narrative style is not persuasive, but offensive. 
Another reason that Wolters fails to be persuasive is not because, 
as Wolters claims, the book challenges "the prevailing wisdom" (p. 8), 
but rather because of the glaring absence of a balanced approach to 
what are controversial and unsettled issues in law, sociology, and edu-
cation. Wolters never concedes that there may be beneficial sociologi-
cal achievements promoted by integration. Schools teach important 
values not measured by achievement test scores. Young children will 
eventually become adults; at some point, both black and white chil-
dren should learn how to get along with one another.8 Yet for 
Wolters, any study that shows desegregation and integration may have 
some beneficial effects should be carefully scrutinized for an ulterior 
motive. Wolters notes that "[t]he Department of Education has spent 
7. Brown v. School Dist. No. 20, 226 F. Supp. 819 (1963), affd., 328 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 825 (1964). 
8. See w. RYAN, EQUALITY 159 (1981). 
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millions of dollars for research on desegregation, but scholars are 
clearly given to understand that 'desegregation is essential' and that 
grants are intended only for studies that will [point to the benefits of 
desegregation]" (p. 285). Thus, Wolters concludes, "[i]t is not surpris-
. ing . . . that much of the government-sponsored research indicates 
that 'there are no losses for white children in the desegregation process 
. . . [and] substantial gains for minority children' " (p. 285). 
Wolters' conclusory comments on the Warren Court and the 
Brown decision are symptomatic of his unusual brand of "balanced" 
approach. In the breadth of nine sentences, Wolters disposes of a rag-
ing academic debate concerning the proper role of the Supreme Court 
in a democratic society and the legal scope of the fourteenth amend-
ment. According to Wolters, the Brown opinion is "shockingly bad" 
as a "matter of law" because the Warren Court "ignored the estab-
lished rule for constitutional construction" by disregarding the intent 
of the framers and ratifiers of the equal protection clause (pp. 273-74). 
Wolters unequivocally states that "the equal protection clause was not 
originally understood to prohibit [de jure or de facto] segregation" (p. 
274). This leads Wolters to conclude that in Brown the Warren Court 
"usurped the power to amend the Constitution . . . and read their 
idea of proper social policy into the Constitution" (p. 274). This un-
supported attack on the Warren Court is not at all surprising, since 
Wolters makes known his dislike for post-Brown courts throughout 
the book. Judges involved in post-Brown decisions are alternatively 
referred to as "arrogan[t]" (p. 63), "disingenuous" (p. 289), and more 
generally as "the ermine of the bench" (p. 155). 
The Burden of Brown, in sum, fails to accomplish what it sets out 
to do: render a "balanced account" of the impact of Brown v. Board of 
Education (p. 329). Instead, The Burden of Brown often becomes 
nothing more than a tasteless and repetitive monograph on conserva-
tive segregationist ideology. As a result, this book fails to contribute 
to the body of academic literature concerned with the sociological, ed-
ucational, and legal effects of Brown. 
